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I. INTRODUCTION
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium might have expected that the
Supreme Court of Canada ruling in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms'
challenge to Customs censorship powers would bring closure to the
bookstore's fifteen-year fight to remove unreasonable obstacles to the
importation of queer literature. Instead, the Court's ruling4 appears to
have simply opened a new chapter in that struggle. The extent to which the
Little Sisters decisionwill foster a new era of restrained Customs censorship,
or make it possible for Customs to continue the same "appalling level of
C 2001, B. Ryder.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Uninersity, The author provided legal
assistance to the Toronto Women's Bookstore in 1993-1994 in the Bookstore's attempts to scure the
release of imported material detained by Canada Customs. He testified regarding hise'penencesth
the vagaries of the Customs' administration as a vatness for Little Sisters at the 1'414 tnal.
Part I of the Constitution Acti 198Z being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1,2 (U.K'). 1402, e.
11 [hereinafter Charter],
2 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada .Mtstcr of Justce. C, 551J 2 S C R+ 112
[hereinafter Little Sistersl.
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over-censorship," 3 remains to be seen. The Court's ruling is disappointing
because it does not do enough to reduce the risk that over-censorship will
simply recur.
The majority of the Court upheld the provisions of the CustomsAct 4
and Customs Tariff that confer the power to detain obscene material at the
border on individual Customs officers. The legislation says nothing about
the training or expertise of these officers. Nor does the legislation provide
a right to even a rudimentary hearing with the Customs' bureaucracy. It
does not give importers the right to view detained material or to make
submissions to Customs officials. Remarkably, the majority absolved
Parliament of any constitutional obligation to improve this obviously flawed
legislative regime of border censorship. This result took some effort since
there was no evidence that Parliament had given serious consideration, in
light of the Charter, to redesigning the procedures in the Act by which
expressive material is detained at the border. Since Little Sisters was denied
the remedy it sought-a declaration that Customs' power to prohibit
imported obscenity was invalid-and had not sought an injunction as an
alternative remedy,6 the result was that no effective remedy was issued to
correct the violations of expressive freedoms and equality rights.7
The decision not to strike down the legislation leaves us with the
impression that, in the face of heightened public scrutiny and attacks on its
legitimacy, the Court was unwilling to spend any of its institutional capital
on such an inflammatory political subject as the defence of imported sexual
representations. By upholding the legislation, and simultaneously affirming
3 Ibid at 1250 per Iacobucci J. dissenting.
4 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.) c. I [hereinafter the Act].
5 S.C. 1987, c. 49, Sch. VII, Code 9956(a) (now S.C. 1997, c. 36. s. 166, Sch., Tariff Item
9899.00.00).
6 In earlier proceedings not part of the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Little Sisters
applied to the British Columbia Supreme Court for a structural injunction to monitor Customs'
compliance with the Charter and the steps taken to correct the deficiencies identified in Justice Smith's
judgment at trial. Justice Smith denied the request for a structural injunction on the grounds that "Itihe
executive branch of government must be allowed some flexibility in how it responds to the Court's
judgment" and "Customs is movingwith dispatch to reform its administrative system": Little SixtersBook
andArt Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1996] B.C.J. No. 670 (QL) (S.C.) at paras. I I and 19.
Justice Smith did issue an interim injunction restraining Customs officials at the Vancouver Mail Centre
from targeting Little Sisters for special scrutiny until the Crown satisfied the court that their discretion
was guided by appropriate standards. And he left it open to Little Sisters to renew its request for a
structural injunction should problems persist.
7 For a full account of the trial, see J. Fuller & S. Blackley, Restricted Entry: Censorship on Trial,
2d ed. (Vancouver: Press Gang Publishers, 1996).
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the hardships unfairly imposed on Little Sisters by Customs, the Court
could have it both ways: it presented itself as the defender of sexual
pluralism and minority rights, without having to suffer the charge that it
opened our borders to the vilest forms of pornography and hate
propaganda! The majority opinion includes positive sentiment-including
validations of Little Sisters' struggles, 9 affirmations of the cultural
importance of queer sexual expression,'o and denunciations of Customs
discriminatory and excessive censorship practices' t -aongside implausible
claims that the law had nothing to do with Customs' failures. Similar to
much of the Court's section 2(b) jurisprudence, its rhetoric on the
importance of freedom of expression is not matched by an appropriately
demanding standard of review at the section 1 stage of Charter analysis.
Justice Binnie, who wrote for the majority of six judges, t2 absolved
Parliament of any remedial obligations by maldng two contradictory moves.
First, he claimed that the legislation bore no causal responsibility for the
many unjustifiable restrictions of freedom of expression demonstrated by
the evidence. The problems, Justice Binnie said, were solely a result of
faulty administration of the discretionary powers conferred on officials by
the Act.' Despite this, he rewrote the legislation to eliminate one of its
most obvious flaws, the failure to include a legal requirement that internal
appeals regarding detained material be resolved within a specified period
of time. All the challenged legislation did was specify that initial
determinations be made within thirty days and that internal appeals be
resolved with "all due dispatch."' 4 Justice Binnie gave the vague exhortation
of due dispatch some content by stating that it too must mean thirty days.S
8 while the Little Sstens case involved a challenge to the portion of tariff item 9399AJ0 GJ that
prohibits the importation of obscenity, if the Court found the procedures set out in the .lct for
administering the tariff were deficient, Customs' p oer to detain hate propaganda and child
pornography (set out in the same Tariff Item) wvould also hase been put in doubt.
9 Supra note 2 at 1136-37,1152-53.
10 Ibid. at 113--9.
Ibid. at 1152-54 and 1201-2.
12 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices L'Heurewi-Dub, Gonthier, Major, and B. starache
concurred with Justice Binnie.
13 Supra note 2 at 1167-S2, 119--1201.
14 Ibid. at 1175-56.
15 Ibid. at 1176. As a result of recent amendments, the Act no longer uses the phrase with "all due
dispatch"; it now specifies that decisions on appeals and accompanying reasons must b2 delivercd
"without delay": ss. 60(4) and (5) of the Act, supra note 4. Presumably this phrase too, should na-.- be
2001]
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Consequently, instead of sometimes facing delays of many months (as was
the case in the past), importers should now receive a final determination
from the Customs administration within sixty days of the initial detention.
At that point, dissatisfied importers will be able to pursue a further appeal
to court where Customs has the burden of proving on the balance of
probabilities that detained material is obscene. Neither the Act, nor the
Court's ruling, places a time limit on the issuance of a judicial ruling on
obscenity. The process, although still time consuming and cumbersome,"
is an improvement in comparison to Little Sisters' experience.' 7
Justice Binnie also made clear that Customs has to take other steps
to improve its administrative processes and decision making in order to
avoid suppressing constitutionally protected expressive material. However,
the Court trusted Customs to identify and implement the needed changes,
and the burden of monitoring compliance was left to future litigation. If
problems persist, Little Sisters and other importers can take Customs to
court. Since the mid-1980s, Little Sisters has spent significant time and
resources trying to correct a dysfunctional Customs administration. While
the Court noted sympathetically that the bookstore had been "a reluctant
participant" in a fifteen-year "running battle with Canada Customs, " " the
effect of its ruling may be to conscript Little Sisters and other bookstores
into further service to ensure that Customs cleans up its act.
In his dissent, which was joined by two other members of the
Court, t9 Justice Iacobucci held that the absence of adequate procedural
safeguards in the legislation meant that it did not constitute a minimal
interpreted as meaning "within 30 days."
1 6 Justice Binnie stated, at 1176, that the time frame he forged "compares favourably with the 60-
day limit stipulated" in American constitutional jurisprudence. In fact, the American requirements arc
much more onerous. In the United States, if Customs seeks to prohibit expressive material at the
border, it must initiate judicial proceedings within fourteen days, and those proceedings must be
completed within sixty days of their initiation: U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 US. 363 (1971) at
373 [hereinafter Thirty-Seven Photographs]. By contrast, the Canadian legislation, as improved upon by
Justice Binnie, requires that importers be permitted to initiate judicial proceedings within sixty days of
their initial detention.
17 The 1994 trial evidence demonstrated that delays of months or even more than a year occurred
in reaching final determinations within the Customs bureaucracy: Little Sisters Book andArt Emporitan
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), (1995) 131 D.L.R. (4b) 486 (B.C.S.C.) at 519. Parliament improved the
situation to some extent by eliminating one stage of the internal review process that importers must
follow before appealing to court: S.C. 1997, c. 36, s. 166.
18 Supra note 2 at 1136.
19 Justices Arbour and Le Bel joined the dissent.
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impairment of freedom of expression. " He was harshly critical of the
majority's failure to provide a remedy to the grave systemic problems
evident in Customs' administration of the law.21 He would have declared
Customs' power to detain obscenity at the border invalid, and suspended
the declaration of invalidity for eighteen months to enable Parliament to
enact a new regime of border censorship more respectful of freedom of
expression.Y This was a cautious remedy, one that gave Parliament plenty
of time to address the issue, and, in the meantime, left Customs' censorship
powers intact. The dissenters did not oppose all administrative censorship
at the border; instead they favoured a more carefully considered regime
thatwas capable of prohibiting the importation of obscene materialwithout
such a large impact on lawful expression. It is troubling that six members
of the Court could not support such a modest affirmation of Parliament's
role in respecting civil liberties.
Despite the fact that the majority of the judges upheld the law,
there is reason to hope that Little Sisters' objectives will be achieved in the
years ahead. For one, the Court provided importers with new legal
arguments that may be effective in encouraging a more cautious approach
by Customs' officials to their powers of border censorship. Also, the Court
gave notice that if the need for systemic reform persists, the next time the
courts will not let Customs off the hook. Injunctions or other remedies
pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter would be issued to reform
Customs' practices and procedures.23
Since the Crown conceded that the Customs legislation interferes
with freedom of expression, the main issue in Little Sisters was whether the
legislation could be upheld as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1 of
the Charter. The section 1 issues raised by the regime of Customs
censorship related to the substance of the obscenity prohibition and the
procedures by which it is enforced. The former had been fully articulated
and defended by the Court in the 1992 Butler ruling,"' so it was not
surprising that the challenge to the content of the obscenity standard itself
failed. It is wrong to suggest, as Professor Benedet does in her comment in
this volume, that attacking the Butler decision was Little Sisters'
20Supra note 2 at 124346.
21 Ibid. at 1250-53.
-- Ibid. at 1265.
23 Ibid. at 1203-35.
24 R. v. Butler, [19921 1 S.C.R. 452.
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"underlying goal."25 Their basic goal was to end Customs' violations of their
rights. To support the bookstore in this goal, it was not necessary to share
the bookstore's view that Butler was a significant part of the problem.
Whatever one's views on the definition of obscenity in Butler, or the value
of sexual expression more generally, one ought to be troubled by the
procedural deficiencies of the Act. A poorly designed administrative
censorship scheme will miss the mark too frequently however the target is
defined. The majority's conclusion that the Act constituted a reasonable
limit on freedom of expression despite theAct's failure to include a range
of modest procedural safeguards, and despite the absence of any evidence
that Parliament had even considered the issue, was startling. In the
discussion below, I will examine in more detail the substantive and
procedural aspects of the Charters section 1 issues.
II. WHETHER THE PROHIBITION ON IMPORTING OBSCENITY
CONSTITUTES A 'REASONABLE LIMIT' ON EXPRESSION:
THE BUTLER ISSUES
The Court's Butler ruling has generated a great deal of criticism and
controversy, especially in feminist circles, where the polarized and
passionate nature of debates regarding sexual expression seem to foster
extreme positions.7' For some, Butler should be celebrated and rigorously
defended as a sacred feminist text." Benedet's comment appears to reflect
such an uncritical assessment of Butler. For others, Butler confirmed and
2.5 J Benedet, "Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice: Sex Equality and the
Attack on R v. Butler" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall LI. 187 at 189 [hereinafter "Attack"].
26 For a sampling of the range of commentary on Butler, see B. Cossman et aL, BadAttitudels on
Trial: Pornography, Feminism, and the Butler Decision (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); C.
MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); K. Busby, "LEAF and
Pornography: Litigating on Equality and Sexual Representation" (1994) 9 C.J.LS. 165; J. Toobin, "X-
Rated" The New Yorker (3 October 1994) 70; A. Scales, "Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad
Attitudes and the Fate of Butler" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L 349; J. Cameron, "Abstract Principle v. Contextual
Conceptions of Harm: A Comment on R v. Butler" (1992) 37 McGill LJ. 1135; R. Moon, "KR v. Butler.
The Limits of the Supreme Court's Feminist Re-Interpretation of Section 163" (1993) 25 Ottawa L
Rev. 361; and L Green, "Pornographies" (2000) 8 J. Pol. Phil. 27.
27 For example, controversy erupted within the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund
(LEAF) because the factum LEAF submitted to the Supreme Court in Little Sisters dared to suggest that
adjustments were necessary to Butler's harm-based approach to obscenity. LEAF'S factum was the
product of extensive consultation that sought to respect a diverse array of feminist views on sexual
expression. It affirmed that the "harm-based equality approach to obscenity law articulated by this
Court in Butler must remain the cornerstone of obscenity law" (para. 28). The factum is available online:
<http:/lwww.umanitoba.caLaw/CoursestiBusby/Gender/factum.html> [date accessed: 15 August2001).
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consolidated obscenity law's role in upholding a repressive sexual
morality. 3 Both positions are exaggerated, but both contain an element of
truth. The Butler ruling's harm-based approach to obscenity was an
improvement over previous approaches. At the same time, the Butler
opinion did not leave behind the view that representations of sex are bad
if unredeemed by art or some other higher social purpose. Moreover, the
definition of obscenity remains vague and open ended, a disturbing state of
affairs for any criminal offence.
In Butler, Justice Sopinka divided obscenity into three categories:
representations of sexual violence; representations of non-Violent adult
sexuality that are degrading and dehumanizing and pose a substantial risk
of harm to society; and sexual representations that used children in their
production. Other sexual representations-most representations of non-
violent adult sexuality-v-ere excluded from the category of obscenity.
While the terms "pornography" and "obscenity" both figured prominently
in Justice Sopinka's analysis, he did not equate the two. Pornography is not
a term used in the Criminal Code3" to refer to representations of adult
sexuality. When Justice Sopinka used the word "pornography" inButler, the
context made clear that he was referring to all explicit sexual
representations. Obscenity law, he said, only captures harmful
pornography. It should not suppress "good pornography.""
Professor Benedet's comment in this volume does not make clear
that she is relying on an understanding of pornography that is very different
from Justice Sopinka's use of the term in Butler. She defines pornography
as sexually explicit material that causes gender subordination. On this
understanding, good pornography is an oxymoron, pornography being by
definition harmful. 2 Justice Sopinka called harmful sexual representations
obscenity; Professor Benedet calls them pornography. Justice Sopinka
23 See, for example, N. Strossen, Defending Pww,-,jyarlv Free Srcrzh, Se- and tMe Fb,ht for
Women's Rights (New York- Doubleday, 1995) at 229-46; B, Cossmanca aLonpra note 26.
29 Supra note 24 at 484-S5.
3 0 R..C. 1985, e. C-46.
3 1 Supra note24at 500,quotingR. West, "The Femintst-Consernati% c Anti-PoographyAlhance
and the 1986 AttorneyGeneral'sCommission on PornographyRepart" (1937)4 AB F. ResearchJ.631
at 696.
32 Professor Benedetfs definition has much in commwn with the dcfimtion that Andrea Iorkin
and Catharine MacKinnon use in their work. See A. D:.orkn, "Against the Male Flood: Cenm,'r-hip,
Pornography and Equality" (1985) 8 Harv. Women's LJ 1; A, D'norkm "I C, MacMlnnon.P,=,a,7qFn. y
and Civil Rights; A New Dafor Women's Equality (Minncarolis: Organzing Against Porno3raphy,
1988); and C. MacKinnon, Onl, Words.supra note 26 at22-
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called harmless sexual representations good pornography; it is not clear
what Professor Benedet would call them. Indeed, it is not clear whether
there is any such thing as a harmless sexual representation in her analysis.
Given these differences in usages, Professor Benedet is wrong to
assert that the Court in Little Sisters and Butler "recognized pornography...
[as] the practice of sex inequality."" It would be more accurate to say that
the Court recognized obscenity, a harmful subset of pornographic (that is,
sexually explicit) representations, as a practice of sex inequality. Indeed, the
only time Justice Binnie used the term "pornography" in Little Sisters was
to emphasize that sexually explicit material is lawful "unless it comes within
the narrow category of pornography that Parliament has validly
criminalized as obscene."34 One suspects that one of the reasons that
Professor Benedet appears so untroubled by Customs' censorship is that
she, like many Customs' officials in the past, has difficulty seeing obscenity
as a "narrow category" of sexually explicit material. She devotes no
attention to articulating the scope of constitutional protection that should
be accorded to freedom of sexual expression. One wonders how the
presumption of harm she appears to attach to sexual expression can be
displaced.
While Professor Benedet's analysis obscures the differences
between her anti-pornography views and the Canadian law of obscenity, on
the other side of the debate anti-censorship feminists have tended to
exaggerate Butler's impact on expressive freedoms. Some critics of
obscenity law have unfairly pinned the blame on Butler for what they see as
the intensification of a campaign of suppression against feminist, gay, and
lesbian sexual expression.35 Critics point to one case that followed closely
on the heels of Butler, the 1992 ruling of Justice Hayes in Glad Day36 that
condemned as obscene a number of magazines containing explicit
descriptions of gay sex. The opinion in Glad Day was indeed regrettably
infused with a crude heterosexism that thankfully one witnesses rarely in
judicial decisions these days. But one conviction does not a campaign make.
Critics also pointed to the harassment of gay and lesbian bookstores by
Canada Customs that continued following Butler, and a 1993 court ruling
upholding Customs' prohibition of an issue of the lesbian magazine Bad
33 "Attack," supra note 25 at 188.
34 Supra note 2 at 1199.
35 Supra note 28.
36 GladDayBookshop v. Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise), [ 19921
O.J. No. 1466 (Gen. Div.), online; QL (OJ).
[VOL. 39, NO. I
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Attitude.37 But that pattern of harassment predatedButler. One of the main
challenges in the 1990s in this area was compelling Customs to abide by
Butler-that is, to stop detaining material that depicted non-violent adult
sexuality." The truth is that obscenity law has become more enlightened in
the past decade compared to the pre-Butlersituation. Criminal prosecutions
based on material depicting non-violent adult sexuality are now rare. And
since Customs amended its internal memorandum to conform to Butler in
1994, detentions of non-violent queer sexual expression have diminished.-s
While signs of feminist-inspired influence began to be felt in the
1970s and 1980s, prior to the Butler ruling obscenity law was dominated by
a conservative morality that sought to suppress the circulation of most
depictions of explicit sexuality. Modest and restrained depictions of sexual
activity were permitted according to an explicit hierarchy of sexual value:
straight sex good; queer sex bad. The Butler test displaced this older
conservative paradigm with a reoriented hierarchy of sexual value:
consensual adult sex good; violent sex (including sex with children) bad.
The older distinction based on a division between "natural/unnatural" or
"normal/perverse" sexwas not aclmovledged in Butler, but it was implicitly
rejected. The Butler ruling reoriented the legal definition of obscenity
around contemporary understandings of gender equality and sexual
autonomy.
Obscenity law, Justice Sopinka wrote in Butler, is not designed "to
inhibit the celebration of human sexuality." ' The state should not seek to
enforce conventional standards of propriety by eliminating representations
of sexuality from the public sphere. Rather, he held, depictions of
37R v. Scy'thes, [19931 OJ. No. 537 (Prov. Div.). onhne QL (OJ).
33 For example, until the eve of the LittleSistas trial in 104, Customs Memorandum D9--1.. the
chief internal means of informing officers regarding the content of obscemt) Ia n. continued to suggest
that all depictions of anal penetration were obscene. See Little Sisters (B.CS.C.), supra note 17 at 557
39Customs has made significant improvements to its internal guidelines and procedures in
response to the Little Sisters litigation. The current 'ersion of Memorandum D9-1- instruts officers
to exercise their power to detain obscenity cautiously, and to resolve an doubts in favour of freedom
of expression. It also provides that importers of detained gcods that may hate arttstic merit (including
all shipments to the book trade) have a right to inspect the goods and make submissions on their
admissibility. See online: <http:fI/',%Av.ccra-adrc.ge.ccIEipubcm!d9.1-.cqd9-1-leq.html> [date
accessed: 15 August 2001). In an effort to promote consistent determinations by informed decitioa
makers, all disputes regarding prohibited expressive material must nor he forvardcd for dcti,:on to
the Prohibited Importations Unit in Ottawa. See Customs' Notice N-339. 2 June 2U, online-
<http:.v(ti,,wv.ccra-adr.gc.catE!pubcmen330eqf cn330eq.html> [date ace' ed' 15 August 2JllJ
40 Supra note 24 at 500.
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consensual adult sexuality are "generally tolerated in our society."'" While
he presented this as a fact, there was a normative or prescriptive element
to the Court's description of community standards in Butler. Indeed, Butler
significantly altered the landscape of lawful sexual expression in Canada.
The most important effect of theButler ruling has been to decriminalize the
production, circulation and consumption of representations of non-violent
adult sexuality.42
This aspect of the Butler decision was confirmed in Little Sisters.
Justice Binnie noted that "Butler affirmed constitutional protection for
sexually explicit expression."43 He held that gay and lesbian erotica is
"perfectly lawful"" and, so long as it is not harmful, "safely outside the
Butler paradigm."45 "A flourishing of sexual expression," he added, "may
have no connection whatsoever with harm-based obscenity."4 6 The Court's
approach requires that the field of sexual representations be divided into
positive expression that celebrates consensual adult sexuality and harmful
sexual representations that promote gender inequality. The key issue is how
harm is to be defined and established.
The risk of harm alluded to in Butler is the risk that the attitudes
and behaviour of men exposed to violent or degrading sexual
representations will change to the detriment of the physical and emotional
security of women and children. In a number of passages in Butler, Justice
Sopinka articulated the state's objectives in such explicitly gendered terms.
For example, he described the goal of obscenity law as the prevention of
the circulation of material that contributes to the formation of "negative
attitudes against women."'47 This raised the question of whether the Butler
formulation should apply in the same way to representations of gay or
lesbian sexuality. The Court disposed of this issue quickly, concluding that
Butler's concern with preventing negative attitudinal and behavioural
changes applied to any violent or degrading representations. If one
accepts that exposure to representations of sexual violence or degradation
41 Ibid. at 485.
42 See, for example, R. v. Hawkins, (1993) 15 O.R. (3d) 549 (C.A.) [hereinafter Hawkins).
43 Supra note 2 at 1158.
44 Ibid. at 1188.
45 Ibi. at 1162.
46 1bid. at 1186.
47 Supra note 24 at 508.
48 Supra note 2 at 1162-67.
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creates a risk of harm, then only reliance on crude forms of gender or
sexual essentialism could serve to limit that concern to heterosexual men
or heterosexual materials. The Court wisely refused to go dovm this path.
The more difficult issues raised by Butler have to do with the
identification of harm. The test is supposed to catch only material that
poses a risk of causing harmful changes in attitudes or behaviour. But since
risk of harm is difficult to prove, or incapable of proof, whether material is
obscene becomes a matter of faith, not evidence. The application of the
Butter test can therefore hinder the "flourishing of sexual expression,"
especially representations of minority sexual practices that can be easily
presumed to cause harm. As Brenda Cossman has argued," the decision
can be read as simply adding a new feminist gloss to conservative morality
and its hierarchy of sexual value. The vagaries of criminal prosecutions and
Customs administration of the obscenity prohibition at the border confirm
that Butler is open to multiple interpretations and leaves room for the
reassertion of old prejudices.50 Indeed, the anti-pornography views of some
feminists, which helped shape the Court's reformulation of obscenity law
in Butler, have increasingly come under fire from anti-censorship feminists
for their insensitivity to the importance of sexual expression and their
willingness to tolerate the negative impact of state censorship on expression
that challenges dominant sexual practices and mores.51
The "degrading and dehumanizing" portion of the Butler test is
particularly problematic in its application. The other two components of the
definition of obscenity-depictions of sexual violence or depictions of
B. Cossman, "Feminist Fashion or Morahty in Drag?: The Sexual Subtext of The Rutter
Decision" in B. Cossman etaL,supra note 26 at 107. see also Strosen, supra note 23 at 234,
50 For a demonstration that the Butleropinion embodies (and hasgenerated) multiple andthiftng
understandings of harm, see M. Valverde,"The Harms of Sexand the Ri of Breasts: Obsemty and
Indecency in Canadian Law" (1999) 8 Social & Legal Studies 181.
5 1 Early critiques of the anti-pornography focus of sme 1970. and 19.03 radical femmist thought
can be found in C. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Dank-e &fop!rtng Female Sestaitv (Boston- Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984), M. Valverde, Set, Power and Pleasure (Toronto: W'omen's Press, 1935) at 12145;
and V. Burstyn, ed., I Vom enAga inst Censordizip (Vancouver: Douglas& McIntyqre, 1935). More recently.
see B. Cossman et aL, supra note 26; Strossen, supra note 23; D. Lacombe, Blue Feoics: Poirn japI,
and the Law in the Age of Feminism (Toronto: Unisersity of Toronto Press, 1994); iss & TcH. Her
Tongue on Aly Theory: Image., Essaysand Fantasies (Vancou, er Pres Gang Publhvhers, 1994); A. Carol,
Nudes, Prudes and Attitudes: Pornography and Censorship (Cheltenham' New Clarvn Pres, 1994); I.
Johnson, Undresing the Canadian State: The Politics #jf Pom", aphy from HickMin to uttler (Halifas:
Fernwood Publishing, 1995); L Segal & M. Maclntosh, eds,,Ser Erposcdk SCutahanddtOe&Pomqraply,
Debate (London: Virago Press, 1992); A. Asseter & A. Carol, Bad Girls and DUt, Pictures- The Chaffenc
to Reclaim Feminism (London: Pluto Press, 19931); and P. Gibson & R. Gibson, cds., Duay Loo!s:
Women, Ponography; Power (London: BFI Publishing, 1993).
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sexual activity that employed children in their production-create some
uncertainty around the margins, but are relatively clearly understood. But
the third category-representations of consensual adult sexuality that are
"degrading and dehumanizing"-is much more elusive and vulnerable to
subjective or even discriminatory evaluations. The potential subjectivity is
supposed to be reined in by reference to "community standards of
tolerance." Since judges have to determine those standards themselves,
normally in the absence of evidence, it is hard to see how they can serve to
constrain judicial subjectivity, existing as they do primarily in the judicial
mind.
In the Little Sisters ruling, the Court denied that these problems
existed, and offered instead an idealized portrait of the community
standards test. While it would be comforting to be able to share Justice
Binnie's view that the community standards test is based on "a national
constituency that is made up of many different minorities," and thus "is a
guarantee of tolerance for minority expression," 2 he seems to be treating
an aspiration as a realized fact.
Another way in which Butler sought to constrain judicial subjectivity
was by holding that "degrading and dehumanizing" material is not obscene
unless the risk of harm it poses to society is substantial. It is not clear,
however, how this substantial risk of harm is to be established in any given
case. In Butler, Justice Sopinka intimated that evidence may be desirable
but that it is not necessary. In some cases, judges can draw inferences of
harm simply by inspecting the allegedly obscene materials. 3
In practice, after Butler, where judges draw the line on the need for
evidence of harm determines the boundaries of obscenity. The Crown will
not be required to adduce evidence if the judge concludes that an inference
of harm can be drawn from the materials themselves. If the Crown is
required to adduce other evidence to prove that materials pose a risk of
harm beyond a reasonable doubt, then the prosecution will fail since (as the
Court acknowledged in Butler) social science evidence is inconclusive on the
issue of harm.
In the leading post-Butler ruling on the meaning of obscenity,
Hawkins,54 Justice Robins of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that
material "portraying necrophilia, bondage or bestiality, or sex associated
with crime, horror, cruelty, coercion or children" can be assumed to be
5 2 Supra note 2 at 1161.
53 Supra note 24 at 485.
54 Supra note 42.
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harmful without expert or other evidence. " This list is composed primarily
of representations of sexual activities that are crimes. On the other hand,
he held that material "in which the participants appear as fully willing
participants occupying substantially equal roles in a setting devoid of
violence or the other kinds of conducts just noted, the risk of societal harm
may not be eident."' In other words, it is not apparent that a substantial
risk of harm will result from exposure to depictions of lavful sexual
conduct. To succeed in prosecutions of such material, the Crown vill be
required to adduce evidence to establish a substantial risk of harm beyond
a reasonable doubt. Since such evidence does not exist, the effect of
Hawkins is that the Crown will not waste resources prosecuting material for
obscenity if it does not involve sexual violence, the use of children,
necrophilia, bestiality or bondage.
It is clear that the Court in Little Sisters was content with the post-
Butlerjudicial definition of harmful material. CitingHawkins and two other
cases that followed the same approach,' Justice Binnie stated that "the
identification of harm is awell-understood requirement."2' What this really
means is that depictions of non-violent sexual behaviour involving
consenting adults are not obscene since the evidence does not establish that
they pose a substantial risk of harm. This reminds us that it is a mistake to
associate the Canadian definition of obscenity with the definition of
pornography used by anti-pornography feminist theorists. For example,
Catharine MacKinnon includes in her understanding of pornography any
material, includingPlayboy, "in which women are objectified and presented
dehumanized as sexual objects or things for use."" Anyone who believes
that the criminal law should suppress all pornography that falls within
MacKinnon's definition should be a harsh critic of the Butler and Little
Sisters rulings.
55 ibid. at 567.
5 6 Ibid.
5 7 In R. v..Jacob (1996), 112 C.C.C. (3d) I (Ont. C.A.), the accused vas acquitted of committing
an indecent act by exposing her breasts in public because there vas "no evidence of harm that is more
than grossly speculative." In R v. Erotica 174co Echange (1994). 163 AR. 181 (Pt"'. Ct.). the court
held that the evidence did not satisfy the requirement of proving a substantial risk of harm bzyond a
reasonable doubt; however, since the material was %iolent. it could be presumed to b2 harmful in the
absence of evidence.
5 8 Supra note 2 at 1163.
5 9 Only Words, supra note 26 at 22-23.
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III. WHETHER CUSTOMSACT PROCEDURES CONSTITUTE
REASONABLE LIMITS ON EXPRESSION: PRIOR RESTRAINT
THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE CENSORSHIP
In Little Sisters, the Court was asked for the first time to measure a
regime of state censorship that operates by way of a prior restraint on
expression against the requirements of the Charter. Previous Charter
challenges to the powers of administrative bodies exercising censorship
powers, including an earlier challenge to Customs censorship 6 and
challenges to the powers of provincial film and video review boards,6' had
not reached the top court. As a result, the Court's jurisprudence on
freedom of expression has been focussed on standards not procedures. The
Court's section 2(b) Charterjurisprudence is preoccupied with whether the
contents of legal prohibitions constitute justifiable restrictions on
expression. The case law examines restraints imposed as a result of criminal
prosecution' or in other proceedings by courts or tribunals at the
conclusion of public hearings.63 The fairness of the procedures employed
to enforce censorship standards has been taken for granted in these
decisions.
In contrast to criminal prosecutions, prior restraints on expression
take place when material is suppressed before it is even published or
disseminated. Most regimes of prior restraint are implemented through
administrative decisions made by members of the executive branch of
government. There are a number of typical features of administrative
60 Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, [1985] 1 F.C. 85 (C.A.)
(striking down a provision of the Customs Act prohibiting the importation of material of "an immoral
or indecent character" on the grounds that it constituted an overly vague restriction on freedom of
expression). Three weeks after the Federal Court of Appeal ruling, Parliament replaced the former
provision with a prohibition on the importation of obscene material: S.C. 1985, c. 12.
61 Re Ontario Film & VideoAppreciation Society (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (Ont. C.A.) (provisions
of Ontario TheatresAct declared unconstitutional for failure to prescribe standards or impose limits on
board's censorship powers); and Re It's Adult Video Plus and McCausland (1991), 81 D.LR. (4th) 436
(B.C.S.C.) (upholding censorship powers conferred by the British Columbia Motion Picture Act).
62 For example, the rulings upholding the Criminal Code offences dealing with hate propaganda
(R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697); obscenity (Butler, supra note 24); communicating for the purposes
of engaging in prostitution (Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1 (J)(c) of the Criminal Code, [199011 S.C.R.
1123); and criminal libel (R. v. Lucas, [19981 1 S.C.R. 439).
63 For example, the rulings upholding the awarding of damages for defamation in Hill v. Church
of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, the orders of the human rights commissions in Canada
(Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [199013 S.C.R. 892; and Ross v. New Bnmswick School District
No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825; and the order of the labour arbitrator in Slaight Communications v.
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
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censorship regimes that make them particularly serious threats to freedom
of expression.
First, officials make censorship decisions routinely in a hidden and
unaccountable manner, before members of the public have any awareness
of the material at issue. Officials may not be provided with adequate
training, time or resources to make consistent or legally intelligible
decisions on a routine basis. Public announcements of decisions or the
reasons for suppressing materials are not issued. As a result, no public
debate takes place about the merits of individual decisions or the value of
suppressed works. An important safeguard against overzealous censorship
is thus absent. Moreover, informed democratic debate about the
appropriate boundaries of freedom of expression is hindered.
Second, administrative censorship decisions ordinarily take place
without the benefit of a hearing. There may be no means of introducing
evidence or othervise defending the merits of targeted material. Parties do
not receive a fair hearing initially, and the costs and delays involved may
inhibit interested parties from pursuing a remedy in court. As a result,
expressive material is more likely to be suppressed in a regime of
administrative censorship.
Third, administrative censorship tends to create a self-serving
institutional bias or momentum towards censorship. In contrast to the
courts, whose job is to determine the boundaries between legal prohibitions
and constitutionally protected expression, individuals or departments
assigned the task of censoring are more likely to measure success by
reference to the quantity of material suppressed.
These problematic features of administrative censorship are not
inevitable. They can be tempered by requiring censors to operate according
to clearly articulated standards in an open and accountable process, by
ensuring that initial determinations can be promptly reviewed at a hearing
where evidence can be presented, the legality of expressive material
defended, and where the state has the burden of proving that suppression
is justified by legal and constitutional norms. Whether a legislature has
been attentive to these kinds of protections in formulating a regime of
administrative censorship ought to be a key consideration at the minimal
impairment stage of the Charter's section I analysis. A law that lacks
reasonable procedural protections to check the potential excesses of a
regime of administrative censorship is likely to result in unnecessary
impairment of freedom of expression.
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In the United States, the imposition of prior restraints on speech
through administrative censorship is presumptively unconstitutional.'
However, the First Amendment will not be violated if procedural
safeguards are in place, including a right to a prompt judicial determination
of the legality of the targeted expression. For example, in Freedman v.
Maryland,"5 the Court noted, in striking down a statute establishing a film
review board, that
Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the
exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger
that he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of
government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a non-criminal process which requires the
prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.'
The Court concluded that only a prompt judicial determination in
an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression.67
Applying the Freedman reasoning to the regime of border
censorship administered by U.S. Customs, the Supreme Court in Thirty-
Seven Photographs" held that Customs censorship powers could survive
constitutional scrutiny only if time limits on the initiation of judicial
hearings were read into the statute. The Court held that Customs has to
commence forfeiture proceedings in court within fourteen days and judicial
determinations must be completed within sixty days of their
commencement. 69 If these time limits are not met, material must be
released to importers. These onerous requirements were necessary, the
64 For an excellent discussion of prior restraint, one that anticipated subsequent developments in
U.S. constitutional doctrine, see T. Emerson, "The Doctrine of Prior Restraint" (1955) 20 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 648. See also, T. Litwack, "The Doctrine of Prior Restraint" (1977) 12 Harvard C.R.-
C.L. Law Rev. 519; and J. Jeffries, "Rethinking Prior Restraint" (1983) 92 Yale LJ. 408.
65 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
66 Ibid. at 57-58. The reasoning in Freedman was applied by the Supreme Court in Teitel Film v.
Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (invalidating a municipal film censorship ordinance) and Blount v, Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410 (1971) (invalidating postal censorship of obscene materials).
67bi. at 58.
68 Supra note 16.
6 9 IbM. at 371-72.
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Court said, to ensure that administrative delay does not in itself become a
form of censorship.
The precise conclusions reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Freedman and Thirt,-Seven Photographs may not be appropriate in Canada
where the distrust of administrative censorship-and the accompanying
idealization of judicial proceedings-is not so severe. The general concern
vAth ensuring that the potential excesses of administrative censorship are
curtailed by procedural protections should resonate in any free and
democratic society. In the Canadian context, ensuring that expressive
material cannot be suppressed in the absence of fair procedures ought to
be an important component of the Charter's section I analysis of section
2(b) violations. In particular, this is a concern that is directly relevant to the
minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test."
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the problems in
the administration of Customs' censorship powers were precisely what you
would expect in a poorly designed regime of administrative censorship.
Little Sisters was systematically targeted by Customs, subject to inconsistent
and implausible rulings, the detention and prohibition of much non-
obscene imagery and text, lengthy delays, and a general pattern of what
Justice Binnie characterized as "high-handed and dismissive" behaviour.!1
The record demonstrated that the Customs legislation, in Justice
Iacobucci's words, "resulted in an appallinglevel of over-censorship."' This
was not anything new. While the targets of Customs' censorship powers
have shifted over time, the problems in its administration existed long
before they were exposed in the Little Sisters trial.' As Justice Iacobucci
noted, Customs has a "long and ignominious record of excessive censorship
throughout this century."' 4 Heterosexism is just the most recently exposed
of a number of moral, religious and political prejudices that have influenced
Customs' exercise of its censorship powers over the years.
70 R v. Oakes 119S61 1 S.C.R. 103. This case articulated the test to be ud v%,hcn dealing %tth
section I of the Charter.
71 Supra note 2 at 1188.
7
- Ibid. at 1250.
73 See B. Ryder, Undercover Censorship: Eploring the Histotyof the Rcgulationof Pubheattons
in Canada" in A. Hutchinson & K. Petersen. cds,. Intcpramu Ccns:mrshp in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. 1999); B. Cossman & B. Rder, "Customs Censvrship and the Charter.
The Litle Sisters Case" (1996) 7 Constitutional Forum 103.
74 Supra note 2 at 1265.
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The government conceded that the Act, by empowering individual
Customs officers to detain and prohibit imported expressive material at the
border, violated freedom of expression.75 The government also conceded
that a provision placing the onus of proving that material was not obscene
on importers could not be justified.76 The issue was whether the rest of the
legislation violated freedom of expression in a manner that could be upheld
as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.
The majority reached the conclusion that theAct, if it was properly
administered to avoid prohibiting non-obscene sexual expression, would be
a justifiable restriction on Charter freedoms. While the prohibition of non-
obscene material could not be justified, Justice Binnie concluded that these
errors had nothing to do with the legislative scheme. The problems were a
result of faulty administration. Accordingly, apart from the reverse onus
provision, he upheld the legislation.
Justice Binnie's judgment is remarkable for absolving Parliament
of any responsibility to build procedural protections into the legislation
establishing a regime of administrative censorship. The usual understanding
of section 1 of the Charter is that the government has the burden of
demonstrating that legislation constitutes a minimal impairment of Charter
rights and freedoms. However, Justice Binnie did not require the
government to show that it had given any consideration to including
procedural protections in the legislation that might have curtailed the
excesses of Customs' censorship. Indeed, in reading the judgment, it is easy
to forget that we are dealing with legislation that violates freedom of
expression and therefore the government is operating in a section 1
environment where it supposedly has the burden ofjustifying its legislation.
Instead of demanding that the government defend its legislative design as
a minimal impairment, Justice Binnie repeatedly characterized the issue as
whether the legislation is capable of being administered in a manner that
respects Charter rights.77 The majority upheld the legislation because of the
possibility of proper administration in the future, despite Customs' utter
failure to do so in the past, and even though Parliament had made no
apparent effort to design the legislative procedures in a manner that
respects the constitutional status of freedom of expression.
Absent from the majority judgment is any recognition that
constitutional doctrine needs to respond to the special dangers of a system
75Ibid. at 1154.
76 Ibid. at 1180.
77Ibid. at 1155, 1193, 1199-1200,
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of prior restraint or administrative censorship. The only comment Justice
Binnie made on the issue seemed to miss the point completely: "The only
expressive material that Parliament has authorized Customs to prohibit as
obscene is material that is, by definition, the subject of criminal penalties
... The concern with prior restraint ... operates in such circumstances, if at
all, with much reduced importance."78
This comment seems to suggest that the only issue is standards, not
procedures, and since the Crininal Code and the Customs Tariff rely on
the same definition of obscenity, the section 1 issues raised by their
provisions are identical. It is as if Justice Binnie is suggesting that legal
standards are self-executing, as if the mechanisms and procedures followed
in their implementation have no impact on the meaning that is given to
them and the scope of their operation.
However, while Justice Binnie failed to analyze the statutory
scheme of prior restraint as a section 1 issue, much of his judgment is
informed by an understanding that reform of Customs procedures is
necessary to prevent over-censorship. While he absolved Parliament of the
need to draft a better law, he sent a clear signal to Customs that it can no
longer be "business as usual."" Inadequate procedures amounted to "a
failure at the implementation level," he said, and need to be addressed
there sl
Justice Binnie undertook a detailed review of Customs' practices
and procedures and made a number of suggestions for minimizing the
negative impact they have on freedom of expression. He began by noting
that complaints about the absence of a fair hearing have some substance z
The initial classification of goods at the border is nothing more than "a
rough and ready border screening procedure"' 3 and, if an importer seeks
the release of prohibited goods, the question "is whether the Department
is ready, villing and able, if required, to establish in court that detained
material is obscene."s The absence of a fair hearing at the departmental
level means that the goal should be to move the issue as quickly as possible
78 Ibid. at 1170.
7 9 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
so "Business as usual" here meaning Customs' practices as documented at the 1994 trial.
8 1 Supra note 2 at 1172.
82 Ibid. at 1170.
83 Ibid. at 1171.
84 Ibid. at IS0.
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to the courts. A court is "the proper forum for resolution of an allegation
of obscenity" because it is "equipped to hear evidence, including evidence
of artistic merit, and to apply the law."$5 If a court concludes that Customs
has acted oppressively, it should consider making an award of costs on a
generous scale.86
To help expedite internal reviews, Justice Binnie suggested that the
thirty day time limits on initial determinations and on review should be
made enforceable by regulation, or failing that, importers should bring
court actions against the Crown.87 In the latter situation, he urged courts to
make substantial awards of costs to help deter the illegal detention of
shipments beyond these time limits.8
More generally, Justice Binnie told Customs to supplement the bare
legislative framework of the Act by putting in place detailed procedures
appropriate for the processing of constitutionally sensitive material."' While
it was up to the Minister to decide what methods are best to ensure that
Charter rights are respected,9 he did offer a catalogue of problems that
need to be addressed. These problems included: inadequate staffing,
training and manuals, failure to ensure expeditious review, failure to
provide officials with updated legal advice, failure to provide importers with
notice of the basis for detention, access to the disputed materials or an
opportunity to make submissions, and failure to provide equal benefit of
the law without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.9'
If these problems are not addressed, Justice Binnie suggested that
the courts should be willing to fashion a more structured remedy pursuant
to section 24(1) of the Charter.92 Indeed, he expressed frustration that Little
Sisters had put all of its eggs in one remedial basket-the bookstore sought
to invalidate the law, and had not framed a request for a structural
injunction if the Court upheld the law. The Court's findings, Justice Binnie
offered, will provide Little Sisters with a "solid platform" from which to
85ibid. at 1181.
8 6 Ibid. at 1182.
87 bid. at 1174.
8 8 Ibid. at 1174-75.
89Ibid. at 1195.
90Ibid. at 1195-96.
91 Ibid. at 1201-03.
9 2 Ibid. at 1203-05.
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launch further court action should their problems with Customs censorship
persist.93
III. CONCLUSION
While the Court's ruling in Little Sisters glosses over problems ,,ith
the definition of obscenity and with prior restraint of expression through
administrative censorship, there is nonetheless reason to hope that the
process will improve. The scrutiny brought to bear on Customs since 1994
by the Little Sisters litigation, and the Court's insistence that Customs'
practices and procedures be overhauled to better respect freedom of
expression, may mean that high levels of Customs' censorship All become
a thing of the past. On the other hand, as Justice Iacobucci noted, Customs
has not yet earned our trust.9 4 A weakness of the majority judgment is that
any improvement depends on voluntary compliance, or, failing that,
continued pressure being brought to bear on Customs through litigation.
It is unwise and unfair to cast the burden of achieving constitutional
compliance and accountability on individuals and cultural institutions, many
of whom will have limited time and resources to devote to the task.
As in the Sharpe93" ruling on child pornography released a month
after Little Sisters, the Court absolved Parliament of any responsibility for
designing a better law. In both cases the Court was confronted with poorly
designed and crafted laws that cast the net too broadly in their zealous
approach to censorship, and had resulted in extreme incursions on civil
libertarian values. It was easy to imagine more moderate, balanced means
of pursuing Parliament's important legislative objectives. However, in both
cases, the Court appeared to strain to let Parliament off the hook, in part
by rewriting the laws to correct some of their most egregious flaws. The
Court's rulings in Sharpe and Little Sisters encourage Parliament to be
cavalier about its constitutional duties, and they discourage future
democratic deliberation about the appropriate scope of freedom of
expression in the context of border censorship or possession offences, even
though none occurred in Parliament in the first place. In these areas, the
interpretive partnership between courts and legislatures that ought to
animate the Charter has been stalled by the Court's rulings at the outset.
93 Ibid. at 1204.
94 Ibid. at 1252.
R. v. Sharpe, [2001]1 S.C.R. 45.
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